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Women, bargaining and change in seven 
structures of world political economy 
MICHAEL ALLEN* 
Abstract. Feminist discourses have changed the vision of the issues and sites of political 
encounter that are important for study in IR. IPE scholars have also been reframing the 
discipline by their focus upon other agents besides states, and other structures of power and 
change, besides those of security and production. But these discourses could also complement 
each other to mutual benefit. This article suggests ways to do that, by positing a framework of 
analysis through which IPE, Feminist, International-Legal/Institutional, Peace and other 
critical discourses could intersect. It suggests that world political economy be conceived of in 
terms of seven intersecting, dynamic structures, in which some common historical processes 
unfold. These include bargaining and rivalry, realist self-interest and morally enlightened 
action. This goes beyond the four structures already recognised in critical IPE discourse, and 
the dichotomous materialist or idealist assumptions about agent motivations, in mainstream 
IR. By including Nurture/Reproduction as one of the seven structures, women's agency, with 
its possibilities and limits, cannot be missed in the normal business of the discipline. 
It has been asserted that women have been marginal in world political economy and 
virtually invisible in theories of International Political Economy (IPE).1 It is 
suggested below that while women have indeed been marginalised from powerful 
roles in formal production for the market, finance, security, law and diplomacy, they 
have been centrally involved in other vital activities in the world economy that 
directly affect these systems. 
IPE scholars have expanded the range of analysis that can be considered 
mainstream IR, or have challenged the projects of that mainstream itself. This 
largely reflects the reality that economic, technological and ecological factors have 
become at least as important as arms and territory used to be, in determining who 
has power in the world, and how it is used.2 An immediate concern here is to show 
that the conceptualisation of women's roles and power in the world economy is also 
necessary even in the newer analysis that IPE scholars have brought to the field of 
IR. 
* 
My thanks to Dr. Barry Gills and Professor Susan Strange for helpful comments on this article, a 
version of which was first presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual 
Conference in 1996. Special thanks to two anonymous reviewers at Review of International Studies 
and especially Professor Mary Osirim of the Department of Sociology at Bryn Mawr College. 1 See Sandra Wfliitworth, 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International Political Economy', in 
Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). Other feminist critics of International Studies reinforce this point, 
such as Jill Steans Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1998), particularly ch. 7. 2 The essays in Nicolas I. Rizopaulos (edj Sea Change (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1991), speak on this point. In particular, see Susan Strange's 'The Name of the Game'. 
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The realities they address are interconnected and are all, at some level, also 
gendered issues.3 An immediate particular discourse that is typified in the work of 
Susan Strange is suggested. It gives a basis for integrating the treatment of appar 
ently distinct IR questions within an IPE approach. Some ways of organising a more 
inclusive vision of IPE are suggested, that build upon conceptualisations of bargain 
ing as a paradigm of change in political-economy.4 
Questions of gender have been important in the latest round of paradigmatic 
challenges and debates in IR.5 Feminists, like IPE scholars, are changing the field. 
6 
Both suggest a redrawing of the boundaries of the field of IR.7 Neither the gender 
nor the IPE critique of IR orthodoxy are monolithic, each subsuming its own active 
debates.8 Yet both have sought ways to theorise the presence, power, ideologies and 
impacts of agencies in world society beyond the usual states, firms, inter 
governmental organisations and guerrilla armies. Both have begun to rework the 
core of the field of IR to reflect the newly-included elements. 
In the process, some basic theoretical issues have been revisited. These have 
included the nature and origins of political awareness, the sources of social change, 
and the possibilities for knowing and communicating valid abstractions about social 
3 An important contribution to the integrated analysis of peace, development and ecology in gendered 
terms is Jennifer Turpin and Ann Lovrentzen (eds.), The Gendered New World Order: Militarism 
Development and the Environment (New York and London: Routledge, 1996). See their 'Introduction'. 4 
Essentially, bargaining is one technique of political encounter among others that include coercion, 
willing submission, incoherent conflict, and altruistic co-operation. Bargaining is an exacting 
exchange between agencies that are connected to the same problems, and is touched-off by changes in 
power or awareness. It is needed in political economy to construct and rearrange social networks. It is 
the archetype at work in coherent argumentation. I have used bargaining as an organising concept in 
IPE in previous work. See Michael H. Allen 'Rival Workers: Bargaining Power and Justice in Global 
Systems', in Roger Morgan et al. (eds.) New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Essays for Susan 
Strange (London: Macmillan, 1993). 5 It has been suggested that previous rounds of debate in IR since that between Liberal 
Internationalism (Idealism) and Realism had been permutations of the latter, until critical questions 
about agencies other than states were raised. See Michael Banks 'The Evolution of International 
Relations Theory', in Michael Banks (ed.) Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on 
International Relations (Sussex, UK: WTieatsheaf, 1984). Even then, gender was left out as Marilyn 
Myerson and Susan Stoudinger Northcutt show in 'The Question of Gender: An Examination of 
Selected Textbooks in International Relations' International Studies Notes, 19:1 (1994), pp. 19-25. 6 An example of the initial stance of IPE scholars is found in Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.) 
The New International Political Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). The femininst impact 
is surveyed in Adam Jones 'Does "Gender" Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of 
International Relations', Review of International Studies, 22:4 (1996). See also Jill Steans Gender and 
International Relations, 1998 (cited in fn. 1). 
7 The traditional concerns of IR have been primarily war and peace issues and secondarily wealth and 
poverty, and how these two axes intersect from the perspectives of states. IPE scholars like Susan 
Strange have redrawn IR boundaries to include the agencies that create intersecting dynamics of 
security, production, finance and knowledge. See Strange States and Markets: An Introduction to 
International Political Economy (New York: Blackwell, 1988). Feminist scholars like Turpin and 
Lorentzen include ecological issues with military and developmental issues within their purview. See 
Turpin and Lorentzen (eds.) The Gendered New World Order, 1996. 8 
Surveys of debates in IPE speak of a Realist/ Mercantilist, Liberal and Radical spectrum. See Roger 
Tooze 
'Perspectives and Theory: A Consumer's Guide', in Susan Strange (ed.), Paths to International 
Political Economy (London: Allen and Un win, 1984); or Geoffrey Underhill 'Introduction; 
Conceptualizing the Unchanging Global Order', in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill (eds.), Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). The spectrum of 
perspectives among feminists includes Liberals, Radicals, Essentialists and Standpoint theorists and 
feminist critical theorists. See ch. 7 of Steans Gender and International Relations (cited in fn. 1). 
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and political reality despite the editorial effects of standpoint bias.9 The prominence 
of such basic theoretical issues in the current wave of critical debate in IR is 
reminiscent of an earlier one between the 'Wisdom' and 'Scientific' schools of 
Realism.10 Now, as then, there is a risk of losing sight of the concrete concerns for 
which critical theory should ultimately be relevant. Hence, one goal of this contri 
bution is to connect practical and critical questions within a serviceable analytical 
framework. 
This is not a gendered analysis in the sense that Gilligan or Sapiro would 
recognise.11 It speaks of women and men without presuming that any psychological 
differences between them as genders always translate into distinctly different 
patterns of change and justice for specific institutions or social contexts. It does 
accept with Bretherton that gender is socially constructed in given contexts.12 
Gendered roles, for the most part, mean empowerment of some men and 
marginalization of others, and of most women. Hence political and economic 
projects that are conceived and executed in gender-neutral terms frequently do 
additional harm, especially to women, even if they also otherwise do some good.13 
But such outcomes seem to be functions of differences in social and economic roles, 
reinforced by ideology, rather than of an essentially male or female way of thinking. 
Perspectives do matter but they vary not only by gender, but also by socialisation, 
ethnicity and class.14 The approach taken here is sceptical of essentialised standpoint 
epistemologies. It attempts to engage in coherent bargaining between the critical 
insights of IPE scholars about core issues in the world economy and the inescapable 
questions of justice from varied gendered perspectives. 
1. Radical critiques of orthodoxy and feminist responses 
The old questions at the core of international studies were: how is security to be 
established and maintained, and, how is national wealth to be protected or 
9 This critical conversation is pursued in articles such as Randall Germain and Michael Kenny 
'International Relations and the New Gramscians', Review of International Studies, 24:1 (1998), and 
Wade L. Huntley An Unlikely Match? Kant and Feminism in IR Theory', Millennium Journal of 
International Studies, 26:2 (1997). Basic questions of IR epistemology are also raised in the 
Introduction and essays edited by V. Spike Peterson, Gendered States: Feminist (Re) visions of 
International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992). 10 See again, Michael Banks 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory' in Conflict in World 
Society (Sussex, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1984). 11 This refers to the essentialist stance in feminism as advanced in the work of Carol Gilligan such as 
'Visions of Maturity', in In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). See also Virginia Sapiro 'Gender Politics, 
Gendered Politics: The State of the Field' quoted in Jones, Review of International Studies (October 
1996), p. 407. 12 See Charlotte Bretherton, 'Global Environmental Politics' in Review of International Studies, 24:1 
(1998), p. 85. 13 
Steans, Gender and International Relations, ch. 6. See also Bina Agarwal A Field of One s Own: 
Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 14 I am sceptical of standpoint epistemologies. Not all women or men in a given social context think 
alike and it is difficult to distill several lived experiences to authenticate a single epistemology. I prefer 
Henrietta Moore's suggestion that different cultures negotiate different arrangements of men's and 
women's gender roles. See her 'Balancing Acts: Gender at the Turn of the Century', LSE Magazine, 
8:1 (1996), pp. 10,11. 
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increased? 'Security' in the first question meant, the independence and territorial 
integrity of the state (government and land). 'National' in the second question used 
to mean landowners mainly, then later also included merchants, bankers and indus 
trialists. The old answer to the first question was: deter aggression by military 
preparedness or by alliances with other states who feared the same states more then 
they feared yours. In other terms, be a Realist. The old answer to the second 
question was: protect your territory and your ships, penetrate foreign markets and 
restrict access to your own, unless you are quite sure that, in a free trade environ 
ment, your nationals will export more than they import. In other terms, in addition 
to being a Realist, be Mercantilist unless you are sufficiently advanced in your 
productive and financing capability to be a Liberal. Make sure you can defend what 
you earn and your right to earn it, first with ideas and rules, then with bargaining 
power in markets, but also with force, if necessary.15 
Contemporary questions in international relations derive from a greater appreci 
ation of the inseparable realities of ecology, technology, ethnicity, class and gender.16 
The agents whose attitudes, actions and power must be considered, include not only 
states, firms and banks, but also male and female workers, householders, parents and 
other socializers and teachers of the young, legal and illegal informal traders, and 
non-state users of force in guerrilla armies, and criminal syndicates. 
Both the Realist and Liberal perspectives focus on too narrow a band of agents? 
states and firms?and universalises the analysis of their motivations and actions. 
Even among states, outlooks, motivations and practices vary.17 Non-state and non 
firm agents are examined in the established tradition, only to the extent that they are 
deemed to affect security and accumulation strategies. Yet these are offered as the 
paradigms of approach to the concerns of the other agents in world society. What 
began before the industrial age as the openly ideological project of aristocratic states 
and, later, of emergent industrialists and financiers has, over a century or so, been 
elevated to the realm of positive universal theory. Despite the scientific dress, the 
paradigms retain their ideological character. When seen in this way, it becomes 
easier to juxtapose approaches that address questions of concern to other agents in 
world society, including women. 
This leads to the question: what changes in analytical approach in IPE might 
make women's agency in world political-economy visible and normal without, in 
turn, obscuring other unrecognised agents or the traditionally recognised ones, such 
as states and firms? 
15 A useful distinction can be made between 'Realism' and 'realism'. The first, Realism, is a recognized 
tradition in IR concerned with the problem of order among states. The second, realism, is an outlook 
on social change that sees politics in terms of competition or conflict among self-interested agents. 
Hence Realism is the realism of states and Liberalism is the realism of markets, Marxism the realism 
of classes and so on. 
16 See Turpin and Lorentzen (eds.) The Gendered New World Order, 'Introduction' and ch. 1 'Women, 
Gender, Feminism and the Environment', by Lorraine Elliot, pp. 13-34. 17 
Petras, for example demonstrates that given states change in outlook and motivation, depending on 
the configuration of social forces that support their incumbency. See James Petras, Critical 
Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World, Monthly Review, NY (1978), ch. 1. 
See also Robert Cox 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 
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Feminist scholars like Steans, Whitworth and Tickner have joined the critique of 
Realism/Mercantilism and Liberalism.18 The main critical points are endorsed. But 
they also criticise Marxism and Dependency/World Systems Theory for some of the 
same failings, namely positive universalism in assumptions about agent motiva 
tions?classes in this case?and subsuming gender dialectics in analyses of class 
conflict (Marxists) and structural constraints (Dependencia). Despite being openly 
ideological theories with a preference for justice in political-economy, Marxism and 
Dependencia paradigms are regarded as almost equally guilty with Realism and 
Liberalism in making women's agency invisible in IPE. Feminists question the 
assumption that men and women bring undifferentiated motivations to economic 
activity at any level. From the perspective of black and brown women in the South, 
Reddock adds the criticism that questions of race and ethnicity, besides gender, are 
subsumed to class in the Marxian and Dependency traditions, and of course, largely 
ignored in the Realist and Liberal ones.19 She argues for an analysis that recognises 
the mutually reinforcing dynamics of all forms of oppression. 
2. Feminist contributions to IPE 
Feminist scholars have done research upon the following features of the world 
economy that are ignored in established approaches: 
Women are under-represented in the most powerful levels of institutions and 
roles in the world economy such as industry, the creation and distribution of 
credit, making and adjudicating laws, and the control of force.20 
Women produce most of the child and elder care in all countries, and for the 
most part do so as unpaid labour.21 
More women than men produce the world's food.22 
Women are the first socializers of oncoming generations of male and female 
workers, consumers, voters and parents, that is, are powerful transmitters of the 
values that shape both the quality of human resources and the disposition of 
consumer demand. The quality of nurture (emotional, physical and intellectual) 
18 
Steans, Gender and International Relations; Whitworth 'Theory as Exclusion'; J. Ann Tickner 'On the 
Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective', in Murphy and Tooze (eds.), The New 
International_Political Economy, 1991. 19 Rhoda Reddock, 'Primacy of Gender in Race and Class', in J. Edward Greene (ed.), Race, Class and 
Gender in the Future of the Caribbean (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
1993). 20 Ann Tickner, 'Hans Morganthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation', 
Millennium, 17:3, 1988; also Tickner, 'On the Fringes of the World Economy'. The World Human 
Rights Guide, 3rd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), compiled by Charles Humana, 
notes that even in Scandinavian countries and the English-speaking democracies, women are under 
represented in government, earn less than men, and are less powerful in households (pp. 8-9). Figures 
from the Human Development Reports 1997, United Nations Development Programme (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) support this. See Table 11, pp. 172-3. 21 See S. M. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); also Diane Elson 
'Gender-Aware Analysis and Development Economies', Journal of International Development, 5:2, 
1993. 
22 
Turpin and Lorentzen, The Gendered New World Order, p. 3; also Human Development Report 1997, 
ch. 3. 
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affects the probabilities of children becoming assets or liabilities to society in 
later years. Inputs to the quality of nurture include parents' access to housing, 
health, education and meaningful political participation.23 
Women in most countries are the primary managers of household consumption 
of perishables (food, clothing, medicines, cleaning agents, fuel, water) i.e. 
nurturing goods, while men retain primary control of the acquisition of durable 
goods (land, cattle, houses, tractors, trucks, generators) i.e. capital goods recog 
nised by banks as collateral for credit.24 
Households are important sites of resource-allocation and political power.25 
Most religions hold strong tenets on marriage and family structure, affecting 
understandings of the roles of women and the socialisation of children. Depend 
ing on how these faiths are interpreted, these tenets may either support or 
undermine the bargaining power of women at home, in public policy debates, 
and in the market place.26 
These areas of research strengthen the case for a reworking of IPE theory. 
In a pioneering collection, Nash and Fernandez-Kelly showed the unfolding 
connections between changing patterns of international production and changes in 
power between classes and genders of workers in different countries.27 Contributors 
demonstrated the place of households in the interdependence of economic pro 
duction and social reproduction. Later contributions have built upon that, such as 
Nash and Safa, with reference to Latin America, and Agarwal and others focusing 
on Asia.28 
The place of households in the world economy was theorised in another way by 
Smith, Wallerstein and others.29 They examined the responses of households in 
different parts of the core and periphery of the world economy to upswings and 
downturns in economic growth. Smith and others found that households change in 
response to economic conditions and are an important site of resistance to the 
pressures of the world economy. 
Other macro-level Marxist-feminist analysts such as Mitter, and Mitter and 
Luijken have traced the effects of the f?minisation of the labour force in manu 
facturing in both industrialised and developing countries.30 Essentially these show 
23 Diane Elson, 'Gender-Aware Analysis'. 
24 Human Development Report 1997, ch. 3; Maria de los Angeles Crummett 'The "Women's Movement'", 
in K. P. Jameson and C. K. Wilbur (eds.) The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1996); I. Palmer, Gender and Population in the Adjustment of African 
Economies: Planning for Change (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1991). 25 Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein, Creating and Transforming Households: the Constraints of the 
World-economy (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); June Nash and Helen 
Safa, Women and Change in Latin America (South Hadley, Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey 
Publishers, 1986); and Nash and Maria P. Fernandez-Kelly (eds.) Women and the International 
Division of Labor (Albany: States University of New York Press, 1983). 26 For an example of the impact of religion on household and market power in South Asia, see Bina 
Agarwal '"Bargaining" and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household', Feminist 
Economics, 3:1, 1997. 
27 Nash and Fernandez-Kelly (eds.), Women and the International Division of Labor. 28 Nash and Safa, Women and Change in Latin America; Bina Agarwal (ed.), Structures of Patriarchy: 
State, Community and Household in Modernizing Asia (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
29 Smith and Wallerstein, Creating and Transforming Households. 30 Swasti Mitter, Common Fates, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy (London: Pluto Press, 
1986); S. Mitter and A. Luijken, The Unseen Phenomenon: The Rise of Houseworking (London: 
Change Publications, 1989). 
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that the f?minisation, automation and mobility of transnational manufacturing have 
weakened previously unionised (male?) workers in relation to capital. In addition, 
they point out, full-time workers in manufacturing have also had to compete with 
out-sourcing from home-based light manufacturing of products like toys and 
garments. Thus, what on the one hand has been the empowerment of some women 
through access to jobs in manufacturing, or access to income with control of time 
for other domestic responsibilities through home-based manufacturing, has, on the 
other hand, increased the disarticulation of labour solidarity, transnational^ and by 
gender. 
Marxist-feminists disagree on the nature of the historical forces behind these 
patterns. Some, like Mitter, see capitalism as being patriarchal to the extent that this 
is useful to accumulation. Others like Hartmann, and Mies, see a positive logic of 
both patriarchy and accumulation at work in modern capitalism.31 In any case, these 
contributions since the 1980's have begun the re-mapping of IPE, with particular 
reference to macro-level structures and dynamics of production, and the place of 
households within them. 
Fewer of these contributions have focused upon the integration of the gendered 
analysis of the public and private spheres of production and reproduction with 
those of war/peace issues, ecological concerns and questions of rights/ideology and 
authoritative institutions. These respective subjects of concern have tended to be 
addressed in separate lines of analysis, and in disciplines other than IR/IPE, despite 
the fact that the connections between them in reality have been recognised.32 This 
has limited the remapping of IPE by feminist scholars. 
3. A complementary IPE discourse 
A discourse has emerged since the 1980s that moves beyond the confines of Realism 
and what I call 'essential realism'.33 Other agents in world political economy besides 
states are recognised, along with their varying motivations, kinds and contents of 
thinking, power and capacities for creating, modifying and reproducing structures at 
global, regional, national and local levels. In discussing historical forces such as 
investment, competition, trade, class conflict or interstate conflict and co-operation, 
there is an attempt to identify actual patterns of human relationships, without 
presuming that they are necessarily reproduced in discrete containers of state juris 
diction, nationality, race, or physical geography. 
Influential works in this counter-orthodoxy include those by Strange, Cox, and 
31 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (London: Zed Books, 1986); Heidi 
Hartman, 'Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex', in M. Blaxall and B. Reagan (eds.) 
Women and the Workplace: The Implications of Occupational Segregation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976). 32 As Turpin and Lorentzen (eds.) have done in The Gendered New World Order. 33 
My critique of Realism and essential realism is contained in 'Politics of Global Industries: Toward 
New Images of World Politics and World Society', paper to the Northeastern Political Science 
Association meeting, Providence, RI, November 1988. 
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Gill and Law.34 Later collections reflecting this influence include Murphy and Tooze, 
Morgan et al, and Stubbs and Underhill.35 
Broadly speaking, these have sought to explain the dialectics of firms, financial 
institutions, classes and states as they integrate four key functions of political 
economy: security, production, finance and knowledge. 
Strange, in particular, demonstrates the close interdependence of the four func 
tions in what she sees as the four basic corresponding structures of the world 
economy.36 Each of the four structures is constructed and driven to change by 
several forces. These include agent motivations (order, wealth, freedom and justice), 
market competition, and technological and institutional innovation resulting from 
the application of scientific theories and social scientific ideas. Other forces include 
conflict between structure-makers and structure-takers over the fruits of production, 
trade and the use of credit, and not least, conflict over control of state policies. 
Each dynamic system needs the others. For example, production requires inputs 
of technology, credit, a disciplined labour force and a context of industrial peace, 
contractual enforceability and market predictability.37 The systems are held together 
by a succession of bargains among its primary agents at different network levels. 
These bargains provide a framework of rules for authoritative decision-making until 
they break down under the weight of changes in power distribution, market 
fortunes, or value-preferences. 
Bargaining frameworks in the security structure have been the most familiar? 
power-balancing alliances, regional security arrangements, Cold War rules of 
conduct and so on.38 Ordering bargains in the production structure have included 
cartels, and quasi-cartels among leading firms and their supporting governments in 
industries like oil and aluminium.39 The politically acceptable boundaries of markets 
have been configured in bargains as varied as GATT, the Lom? Convention, the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the Multifibre Agreement, NAFTA and the WTO. 
The bargains that really organise the financial structure are even more decentralised 
and obscure than the formal ones struck in the interstate contexts of the IMF and 
the Bank for International Settlements.40 
34 
Strange, States and Markets; R. W Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the 
Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); S. Gill and D. Law, The Global 
Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1988). 35 
Murphy and Tooze, The New International Political Economy (see note 6); Stubbs and Underhill, 
Political Economy and the Changing Global Order; Roger Morgan et al., New Diplomacy. 36 
Strange, States and Markets. 37 On the interdependence of the knowledge and security structures respectively, with other structures, 
see essays by Steven Gill and Barry Buzan in Stubbs and Underhill (eds.), Political Economy. 38 Buzan in Stubbs and Underhill and other work by the same author. 39 I have traced the example of the world aluminum industry, which has moved through several ordering 
bargains. See Michael H. Allen, Bargaining and Change: The International Bauxite Association, 
1973-1977, Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 1984. 
40 On the political framing of trade bargains see Victoria Curzon Price, 'The Decay of GATT: Does 
Multilateralism have a Future?' in Roger Morgan et al. (eds.), New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War 
World (London: Macmillan, 1993). See also Miroslava Filipovic, A Global Private Regime for 
Capital Flows', paper presented to British International Studies Association, York, December 1994; 
and Susan Strange, 'Transnational Financial System of the 1990s', paper for the International Studies 
Association, Vancouver, 1991. See also Orson Watson, 'The Soros Proposal: Credit Risk Insurance as 
Global Governance', paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, 
Minneapolis, March 1998. 
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Other scholars in the counter-orthodoxy also integrate the wide range of IR 
subjects within an IPE framework. Cox's work explores the mutual feedback effects 
among the structures of transnational production, the national and public inter 
national institutions created to secure and service that production, and the social 
forces asserting themselves to reinforce or reinvent those relations of production, 
institutional arrangements, and the attendant rules and ideologies.41 Regarding 
public international authority and rules, Gill sees new developments in regional 
institutions like the EU as expressions of the contemporary needs of globalised 
capital.42 The globalist and Liberal ideological thrust for juridical protections for 
property, as the basis for the reliability of market transactions, is consistent with the 
emphasis on human rights and constitutional government around the world. From a 
globalist perspective these make practical sense in terms of the security of the 
environment for investment and trade. In this context, questions about who gets to 
shape the ideological and theoretical agenda for debate about rights, equity and 
sustainability become politically important. Thus the politics of knowledge has 
attracted particularly critical attention in the IPE counter-orthodoxy.43 
By and large, what seemed like separate subjects in the orthodox paradigms that 
have dominated IR previously, are naturally integrated in the IPE counter 
orthodoxy, because the security, production, finance and knowledge functions are 
regarded as facets of connected historical processes. 
This discourse makes a nuanced analysis of the post Cold-War globalised world 
political economy possible, even as it spawns different models of reality and different 
visions of a desirable future. It allows different kinds of agents?farmers, workers, 
bankers, states?perhaps by the mere fact of recognising them, the possibility for 
analysing the world from their own perspectives without losing a sense of the 
perspectives and power of others. But there has not been much explicit inclusion of 
women as specific agents in this discourse. 
It is not a big step to take advice from Elson and disaggregate workers into male 
and female, since they tend to bring different concerns to the search for paid 
employment.44 As Standing shows in her analysis of the f?minisation of global light 
manufacturing industries, the bargaining power of women workers for wages and 
job security is generally much weaker than that of men.45 The contributions of 
Nash and others, and Mitter and others would show that bargaining power has 
changed by gender, geography and class as a result of the technological sophisti 
cation, global mobility and f?minisation of the production structure in recent 
years.46 This analytical change would certainly enrich the understanding of agency 
41 
Cox, Production, Power and World Order. See also R. W Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: 
Beyond International Relations Theory', in R. O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 42 Gill and Law, The Global Political Economy; also Stephen Gill, 'Global Macro-economics and the 
Internationalization of the State: Regulating the Power of Capital'. Paper presented at the British 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, Warwick, England, 1991. 43 This is reflected in renewed interest in the thought of Gramsci and of Kant. See Randall Germain 
and Michael Kenny, 'International Relations and the New Gramscians', and Wade L. Huntley, An 
Unlikely Match? Kant and Feminism in IR Theory' (see fn. 9). 44 Diane Elson, 'Gender-Aware Analysis and Development Economies', Journal of International 
Development, 5:2, 1993. 45 
Guy Standing, 'Global Feminization Through Flexible Labor', World Development, 11:1, 1989. 46 Mitter and Luijken, The Unseen Phenomenon; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, Women and the 
International Division of Labor. 
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and power in the world production structure as conceived by Strange and others, 
and inform my own analysis of global rivalry among workers and the bargains they 
can and cannot make with firms.47 
I carry over the Marxian notion of modes of production into this discourse, by 
suggesting that there are four main modes in the contemporary world economy. 
These are the global, national capitalist, informal (mostly urban) and subsistence 
(mostly rural) modes of production. The key functions of security, finance, 
production and knowledge have to be applied in all of them, and they comprise 
different mixes of capital-labour inputs, class and ethnic configuration/conflict, and 
degrees of market competition.48 The richest in capital, knowledge and organisa 
tional assets is, by far, the global mode, followed by the national capitalist. Generally 
speaking, informal and subsistence activity is associated with poverty, except in the 
case of illicit drug trade. As the research of feminist economists already cited shows, 
women figure prominently in subsistence and informal production, much less so in 
national and global modes of production. Where they do get recruited into these as 
workers, it is on very unfavourable terms and at generally low levels of remuneration 
and decision-making authority.49 
Even with these changes, analysis using the four fours (four functions, four modes, 
four values, four primary agents) does not get to the heart of the problem that 
women face as contributors to the world economy. It is the old one, that if particular 
women accept the responsibility of childbearing and nurture, they must either find 
ways simultaneously to support themselves and their offspring, or depend in whole 
or in part upon partners, extended families, charities or states. To forestall the 
powerlessness of dependence, they must have access to means of power and 
production like education, land, equipment and credit. If the rules and values in the 
cultures in which they live constrict their rights of inheritance, control of repro 
duction, and control of time (for paid or unpaid work ), their basic needs and those 
of their dependants are likely to be inadequately met. This problem is obviously 
greater in the informal and subsistence modes of production where partners and 
extended families, as potential sources of subsidy to women's incomes, are them 
selves relatively powerless in terms of land, capital, knowledge and credit. 
Women as nurturers have to ensure domestic consumption. Single women with 
few prospects for inheritance or without high levels of education, must ensure their 
own support. Thus, both mothers and single women without children may have 
reasons to enter the job market at very low wages, motivated by a logic of security of 
consumption rather than that of the maximisation of returns on effort. So the 
household as a site of political-economic resource-allocation and bargaining is a 
necessary addition to new IPE descriptions of context. With the household as level 
of analysis, we are forced to look at the difference women's participation makes to 
structures, and at differences in motivations for economic and political participation. 
Assumptions of rationality and universal motivations will not provide satisfactory 
explanations. 
47 
Allen, 'Rival Workers' (see fn. 4). 48 Political economy in South Africa demonstrates this mix, as I argue in 'Bargaining Dynamics of Post 
Apartheid State: Market, Class and Ethnic Dimensions', in Paul B. Rich (ed.), The Dynamics of 
Change in Southern Africa (London: Macmillan, 1994). 49 The UNDP Human Development Report 1997 shows in its gender empowerment measure that 
women's roles in administration and management, professional and technical occupations and shares 
of earned income are still well behind those of men in all categories of countries. Table 3, pp. 152-4. 
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4. Bargaining in households and basic IPE structures 
The explicit inclusion of households as a subject of analysis in IPE draws attention 
to nurture/reproduction as a fifth basic function of political economy. While this has 
been explicit in feminist economics and implicit in the new IPE discourse, it is 
useful, both in terms of analytical elegance and the counter-hegemonic politics of 
knowledge, to make it explicit in the emerging synthesis, with the same status as 
security, production, finance and knowledge. 
Moreover, authoritative decision-making in terms of rules, and the construction 
of meaning, values and identity are distinct political-economic functions that give 
rise to networks of relationships, and influence the evolution of the security, 
production, nurture and other structures.50 All seven are at work in households as 
much as they are in markets, public institutions and interstate encounters.51 For 
present purposes, the argument is developed with respect to households. 
Some of the most important decisions that affect the degree and content of 
demand in the world economy are made in households. Even infants and children 
are consumers, and in some countries, focused marketing is directed at them directly 
or through their caregivers. Significant aspects of lifestyle are expressed in house 
holds, even as these are themselves shaped by beliefs, ideas and values emanating 
from other sources such as popular media and religious communities. Lifestyles are 
further constrained or facilitated by levels of income or subsistence activity. House 
holds are where human energies are replenished for the workplace and the market. 
They are the places where new cohorts of workers, professionals, entrepreneurs and 
citizens are produced and the first stage of the investment or disinvestment in their 
emotional, ethical and intellectual capital. Where this is done well and at low cost? 
especially as it is subsidised by women's labour in worker nurture, childcare and 
subsistence farming?it lowers the cost at which both women and men can come 
onto the formal labour market. This is consistent with the interests of firms in both 
the national capitalist and global modes of production, and with the policy needs of 
states that pursue strategies requiring competitive wages. 
So, women's nurturing labour subsidises the formal economy by making male and 
female workers productive and firms and states competitive. But women are paid 
50 WMe legal scholarship and jurisprudence are clearly part of the knowledge structure, rules and the 
everyday practices that operationalize them are as distinct from legal scholarship as shopping is from 
economic theory. Rules both shape and reflect what is acceptable behaviour in markets and 
institutions of authority. In most complex social formations, the relations of authoritative decision 
making are as distinct as those of production, finance or advanced knowledge. The relations of 
meaning and identity-construction (religion) are also usefully seen as distinct. In premodern times 
these shaped the relations of production, finance, knowledge and authoritative decision-making more 
than they do now. With the perceived failure of modernity in many parts of the world there are 
revised attempts to make religion the basis of political-economic coherence, many times, at the 
expense of women. See Mark J?rgensmeyer, 'The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism' in 
Journal of International Affairs, 50:1, Summer, 1996. See also N. J. Demerath III and Karen S. 
Straight, 'Religion, Politics and the State: Cross-Cultural Observations', in Cross Currents, 47:1, 
Spring 1997. 51 I place law and order in distinct domains because in any social context, those who hold legitimate 
decision-making status are not necessarily also the ones who can assure order. People in countries 
with powerful counter-elites like drug barons or corrupt soldiers know this well. Those whose power 
to coerce must be taken into account, despite the rules, are part of the security structure. At the level 
of households, if laws against spouse abuse are absent or not enforced, the victim partners have both 
a security and a nominative problem. 
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only as dependants or when they enter the market themselves as workers or traders. 
The resulting exploitation can only be eradicated if men put more time and energy 
into nurture, and firms and states either reward men for doing so, subsidise the cost 
of nurture, encourage women to enter the marketplace during their most productive 
(and reproductive) years, or all of the above.52 The greater inputs of active fathering 
would both enrich the quality of life and strengthen the investment in the 
preparation of the next generation. For this to occur there would have to be changes 
in the power of women in relation to men within the household, and in relation to 
firms and states. There would also have to be changes in the thinking and values of 
men, in the paradigms of personnel management (in firms), and macro-economic 
management and IPE (in states). 
Some of these changes are occurring. Trends in American and European law and 
in company practices have made it easier for women or men to balance nurturing 
and workplace responsibilities. Especially in high-skill labour markets, companies 
increasingly regard easing the nurture/production tension as good investment.53 
Households have become even more important sites of decision-making in the 
world economy following the adoption by states of the free trade norms of the 
Uruguay Round and the WTO rules. States have given up much of the right to be 
gatekeepers of their domestic consumer markets, in exchange for the chance to have 
greater access to the world market for firms in their own jurisdictions. Any 
nationalist consumption strategy which gives preference to local producers will 
largely have to be articulated at the level of households. This is a tremendous 
opportunity for women, to the extent that they primarily manage household con 
sumption, to increase their bargaining power with states, over the terms on which 
nurture and reproduction are delivered to the macro-economic mix. The change in 
the legal or formal authority structure has created an opening for change in other 
structures. In the context of such bargaining, states and public international agencies 
like the IMF, IBRD and WTO might be induced to act more concertedly upon the 
knowledge that the poverty and powerlessness of vast numbers of women in the 
world economy undermines their capacity to make the human capital investments 
from which everyone?not least states and firms?benefits.54 
Negotiating a new relationship requires not only a change in the distribution of 
opportunities to exercise power but also a change in consciousness, without which 
these opportunities may pass unnoticed or may not be perceived as desirable.55 
This returns us to the question of socialisation and notional influence. Most 
women and men are influenced most immediately by the world views and ethical 
52 The Swedish state has attempted to do much of this with mixed results. See Anna Nelson 'Sweden: 
Equality and Difference in the Labor Market and in Family Policy', Senior Thesis, Bryn Mawr 
College, April 1996. See also Maud L. Eduards, 'Toward a Third Way: Women's Politics and Welfare 
Policies in Sweden', Social Research, 58:3, 1991. 
53 See Hal Morgan and Kenny Tucker, Companies that Care (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). 54 It is true enough that IMF functionaries are aware of these connections as evidenced in their 
publications, such as: Paul Gleason, 'Poverty Reduction and Structural Adjustment discussed at IMF 
Seminar', pp. 178-82, IMF Survey, 22:12, June 14, 1993, International Monetary Fund, Washington 
DC. However, the practical effects of IMF-imposed adjustment requirements, specifically for women 
in developing countries, remain in tension with the spirit of such publications. On these practical 
effects, see Mary J. Osirim, 'The Dilemmas of Modern Development: Structural Adjustment and 
Women Micro-entrepreneurs in Nigeria and Zimbabwe' in Turpin and Lorentzen (eds.), The Gendered 
New World Order. 
55 I demonstrate this point in Bargaining and Change (see fn. 39 above). 
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systems of their local cultures rather than by the scholarly theories and formal 
ideologies emanating from universities, public agencies, even NGOs. For the most 
part, this means religious communities, family ties, school systems and popular 
culture. Even for this reason alone, it seems to make sense to regard systems of 
meaning and values (both formal and informal) as having a dynamic impact in the 
world economy distinct from that of the scientific and technical knowledge structure. 
Marxist, Gramscian and other radical theorists have tended to lump these two, 
together with law, as 'ideological production' but this will no longer do. We cannot 
talk about households as IPE context, or about nurture/reproduction as basic IPE 
function, without reference to the relations of meaning and value identification, or 
reference to the structure of rules that constrain or reflect the behaviour of their key 
agents.56 
These normative systems, and the institutions and social ties which foster them, 
shape how women and men understand their mutual obligations as well as those to 
companies, and states. At some moments these norms make people uncomfortable 
with their real actions in these relationships. The moments of discomfort are 
opportunities for reflection and possible renegotiation of prior relationships. 
The impact of the power to interpret religious tenets in ways that either restrict or 
emancipate women, is demonstrated, for example, in essays by Nahid Toubia and 
others.57 They show that in several Arab countries, resurgence in religious con 
servatism in the 1980s meant retrenchment of women's social and economic 
freedoms. Their capacities to organise and resist on a religious front, nationally and 
transnational^, have in turn been limited institutionally and legally by states in 
whose jurisdictions they live. While women's own experiences, plus contact with 
advanced knowledge through education (for some), have led to a desire for change, 
the capacity to act in any one sphere is limited by constraints in others. Voices from 
other parts of the world also show that religion is a frontier of ethical struggle where 
issues of household and market, productive and reproductive power are at stake.58 
Law (rules, authoritative decision-making procedures and their philosophical 
justifications) is a reflection of configurations of power, and an indicator of the 
relative strengths of competing ideologies in any given context.59 As such, law is a 
domain of struggle between cultures, genders, classes, nations and modes of 
production. At present, those who hold power in the global mode of production are 
mainly Western and Judaeo-Christian and are succeeding in renegotiating prior 
structures of law around the world. This is evidenced in treaties for trade and 
investment liberalisation and in the internationalisation of authority in treaty-based 
institutions such as EU, NAFTA, WTO, and UNCLOS. The authority of territorial 
56 This dialectical understanding of law or authoritative decision-making in the context of real political 
economy is well demonstrated in the work of Richard Falk in International Law. See Richard Falk, 
'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order' in New Political Economy, 1:1, 1996. 57 Nahid Toubia (ed.), Women of the Arab World (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 
1988). 58 See Diana L. Eck and Devaki Jain (eds.), Speaking of Faith: Global Perspectives on Women, Religion 
and Social Change (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1987). 59 I draw this understanding of law from the work of Richard Falk, as in The Status of Law in 
International Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1970, Part I. As he and others who take 
a Social Science approach to International Law point out, law is not always relevant, since those 
whom legal logic and juridical standing favour are not always the ones who have coercive power to 
deliver or disrupt order. This points to the usefulness of regarding the security and authoritative 
decision-making structures as distinct in world politics. 
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states has given considerable ground through negotiation to the new forms of 
transnational, transgovernmental, international and supranational authority.60 What 
remains of state authority is under globalist pressure for democratic reform. 
To the extent that the f?minisation of the production structure has been an 
important element in the globalist strategy to foster competition among workers, 
globalist and feminist agendas have coincided on the question of women's access to 
the marketplace. At the same time, feminists have run into opposition on questions 
of law and rights from those guardians of national capitalist and other territorially 
or culturally-specific modes of production, who in resisting globalist penetration, 
also reject its feminist and other democratic elements as being Western and/or 
Judaeo-Christian.61 So, at present, both globalisation and economic/religious 
nationalism are contradictory historical processes, both containing emancipatory 
and oppressive elements. In some instances, the rearguard action of cultural 
nationalists has led them to adopt positions that are less respectful of women's rights 
than their own states had adopted, or acquiesced to, in the United Nations in the 
post-war decolonisation period.62 
Certain categories of rights were defined and sharpened in the Cold War and de 
colonisation debates. Competing camps that drew on different philosophical tradi 
tions were forced to put their best principles forward for strategic reasons, even if 
they were not yet ready to implement them at home. Nonetheless, normative seeds 
sown in a state-centric strategic agenda in one context, have grown up to be 
harvested by other agents in the world economy in a different context. 
Thus, the history of debates and resolutions within the UN system on questions 
of Human Rights, development, labour standards, women's rights and the rights of 
children have produced formal principles which are ahead of the current practices of 
most states, firms, religious communities and households, in terms of justice for 
women.63 So while authoritative institutions and rules lend normative support, and 
in some instances may even be justiciable in municipal and international courts in 
the cause of women's rights in the household and in the marketplace, the inertia or 
outright resistance of those who hold power in terms of physical security, invest 
ment, credit and religious loyalties must still be overcome. 
To sum up, feminist contributions have further shifted our prior images of the 
structure of world society. We are forced to break out even further from the earlier 
focus upon the tight cluster of agents such as states, firms, and interstate institutions. 
The new IPE discourse had already included workers, farmers, and marginal groups 
60 There is an emerging discourse on new forms of authority in international political economy. On 
transgovernmental trends see Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The Real New World Order', Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 1997; on transnational forms of authority see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the 
State: the diffusion of power in the World-economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On 
nascent supranationalism, see again Gill, 'Global Macroeconomics . . .' (see fn. 42 above). 61 See again Nahid Toubia (ed.), Women of the Arab World. 62 It is helpful to remember that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was supported by 
a wide cross-section of states from all regions and religions of the world, albeit after much caution 
and equivocation on the part of some delegations. This contrasts with some nationalist protests since 
then, that universal minimal standards are impossible, or are necessarily expressions of Western 
hegemony. 63 For example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which speaks of 'the equal rights of men 
and women' dates back to 1948; the 'Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953' entered 
into force in July 1954; and the 'Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1967' 
was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in November 1967. 
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outside of formal capitalism. Scholars in Peace and Conflict Studies had already 
pointed to the importance of religion and other sources of ethnic identity-forma 
tion, as factors in local and regional conflicts. The links between persistent conflict 
and market disruption and postponed development are well-established analytic 
ally.64 Thus the social formations created by religious affiliations were already 
becoming part of the disciplinary concern in IPE. But feminist scholarship on the 
household calls into specific focus the gendering effect of religion and popular 
culture upon bargaining power within the household, upon the limits or possibilities 
created by legal rights, and upon local and, eventually, transnational divisions of 
labour.65 
In adding legal and religious/popular-cultural formations to the networks of 
agencies recognised in IPE, we may do so in ways that explore their impacts not only 
upon identity and aesthetics, influencing market and juridical boundaries, but also 
upon which genders get what, when and where, in familiar local, national and global 
political economy. 
5. Prospects for new gender bargains 
Women need a new deal with men in households, with banks for recognising new 
forms of creditworthiness, and with firms and public service institutions for valuing 
the perspectives they might bring to management at all levels. Women seem to be 
getting a new deal with states in developed countries, and intergovernmental 
agencies like the IMF. Public expenditures and legislation on childcare, family leave 
(for women and men), health (including reproductive health and family counselling) 
have come to be more widely recognised as sound macroeconomic and political-risk 
investment.66 
These postures of some states are a reflection of the extent of their embrace of 
globalist agendas. There are active debates within IGOs on the political economy of 
development. However, even the IMF, previously known for its neo-liberal rigour, 
has in recent years come to state the need for empowerment strategies.67 This is so in 
spite of the unfortunate practical effects for women, of its adjustment requirements 
in developing countries. As one of the premier institutions that facilitate globalisa 
tion, the IMF could be expected also to reflect that element of the agenda that 
encourages the f?minisation of markets. So the question is whether the gendering of 
the agendas of transnational firms, globalist states and public international institu 
tions reflects an extensive or strictly limited commitment to women's empowerment. 
64 See again Turpin and Lorentzen, The Gendered New World Order; see also Johann Galtung, Peace by 
Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilizations (Oslo: International Press, 
Research Institute, 1996). 65 See again Agarwal 
' 
"Bargaining" and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household', 
Feminist Economics, 3:1, 1997. 
66 The Clinton administration in the United States has strongly advocated family leave and other 
legislation that reflects awareness of the connections between household economies and the market 
economy. 
67 See for example David Cheney, 'Conference Addresses Major Issues Relating to Global Poverty', 
IMF Survey, 22:3, February 8, 1993. 
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The humanising effects for some women in some parts of the world economy could 
be an end in itself or the fortunate by-product of more pressing concerns. 
The latter seems to be the case, because this moment of choice in the world 
economy is like earlier ones involving powerful interests and powerful principles. 
These included: the slave trade debate and treaty negotiations at the turn of the 
nineteenth century; slavery itself in the first half of that century; workers rights and 
unionism thereafter; choices on the rights to self-determination of peoples living 
under colonialism and apartheid following the two world wars; responses to the 
economic nationalism of the late 1960s of states whose minerals like oil, and bauxite 
were wholly owned by multinational corporations; responses to those same states in 
the 1970s as they jointly protested the unfairness and economic dysfunctionality of 
the Bretton Woods Order; and responses of nuclear states to non-nuclear ones in the 
1980s about the arrogance of a nuclear game exclusive to the nuclear powers that 
had consequences for all peoples. 
In all of these moments the question was whether principles, derived from 
common conceptions of humanity and justice?jus cogens?would prevail above 
interests as defined then by the key agents who held power in the structures of the 
world economy. Their lessons are not encouraging. 
To select a few, the British could afford to agree to end slave trading in 1807 
because labour needs in the West Indies were changing in the face of new plantation 
technologies and the reproduction of resident slave populations. They could even 
police the West African coast against slaving since they now had an interest in 
having trading competitors not undermine the climate for new kinds of alliances and 
trade with West African states.68 Similarly, slavery itself could end because new 
approaches to production became more viable.69 Apartheid could be abandoned 
because a critical mass of the Afrikaaner elite had outgrown its dependence on 
incumbency in the state apparatus and had become more capitalist than racialist.70 
Nationalisations and joint ventures by host states in the 1970s, were eventually 
accommodated by companies and their home governments because the latter had 
secured new ways of getting raw materials and controlling world markets in metals 
and minerals industries.71 Enlightened self-interest seemed about to be given a 
chance by rich states in the North-South negotiations of the late 1970s in a kind of 
international Keynesian new deal, since their own economies were not realising 
adequate growth.72 The whole venture was scuppered by the victory of supply side 
administrations and doctrines in key states in the North. Self interest did not so 
much compete with principle?it became the principle, complete with its own moral 
justifications in the name of efficiency and individual responsibility for economic 
outcomes. Bargains to reduce the number and categories of nuclear weapons as well 
as harmful techniques of testing could be reached when the number and quality of 
68 This is the thrust of Eric Williams' thesis in Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1966). 69 
Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. 70 Michael Allen 
'Bargaining Dynamics of a Post-Apartheid State' (see above fn. 48). 71 An example of this is found in the case of aluminum. See Allen, Bargaining and Change (see fn. 39). 72 This was a major argument of the two Brandt Commission reports: North-South: A Program for 
Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980) and Common Crisis, North-South Co-operation for World 
Recovery (London: Pan Books, 1983). 
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the weapons systems threatened the economic and military security of the states 
involved and when new technologies of testing had already been found.73 
The entry of Liberal feminist concerns?treating men and women the same in the 
public sphere?to the mainstream of ideas and public policy in the industrial 
democracies, and their spread to other political spaces where global production, 
trade and legal rules are taking root, occurred when it was consistent with the 
interests of transnational firms.74 
It would seem that in every instance, any victory for principle had to await its 
coincidence with new interests of the powerful. Further bargaining on the principle 
of fairness to women would seem to require a redefinition of self-interest among 
those who now hold power, in addition to the mobilisation of women's own incre 
ments of power in households, congregations, markets and states. 
A cynic might conclude that only Pyrrhic victories are possible in such moments 
of negotiation in political-economy, that processes of domination move on to new 
structures and techniques, leaving empty human gains in their wake. While this is to 
some extent true, the advances beyond slavery and so on are also genuine, and a 
quotient of justice is extracted at each paradigmatic shift. 
To be sure, principles of justice have shaped the actions of a significant number of 
persons more powerfully than immediate self-interest, in every one of the struggles 
just mentioned. Some planters objected to slavery on principle and acted upon their 
convictions.75 Many Afrikaaners in South Africa gave up careers, social acceptance 
and even freedom for the cause of non-racial democracy.76 The new post-apartheid 
state gave up nuclear weapons on principle, despite the regional and global prestige 
attached to their possession.77 Many men accept a slower path in their careers in 
order to contribute to nurture and homemaking. But such actions against the 
prevailing norms require a transformation of consciousness that seems to arise only 
in a small minority of persons.78 For the most part, people are for or against change 
for reasons of practical interest, and apply their powers of reason, wealth and force 
to that end. 
Marx had already recognised that the powerful protect their interests through 
ideology. Mannheim agreed but warned that even revolutionaries are mere 'Uto 
pians', disguising self-interest in change with visionary universal principles.79 Weber 
had noted that social agents adopt and interpret ideas in ways that are consistent 
73 Undersea and atmospheric tests of nuclear warheads could be systematically banned between 1963 
and 1974 largely because the major nuclear states had, by then, invented underground testing. France, 
which lagged behind in this technology was slower to stop than the US and USSR. A useful 
backgrounder remains Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, Olaf Palme and others 
(London: Pan Books, 1982). 74 See again S. Mitter (see fn. 30). 75 On Jamaican instances, see Aggrey Brown, Color, Class and Politics in Jamaica (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1979). 76 The example of Beyers Naude comes to mind. See The Trial of Beyers Naude: Christian Witness and 
the Rule of Law edited by the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva and London: Search 
Press in conjunction with Rovan Press, Johannesburg, 1975). 77 See Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
particularly the chapter on South Africa by David Fischer. 78 I raise this point as a question of critical reaction to Manfred Halpern's theory of Transformation in 
'Politics of Global Industries'. 
79 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936). 
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with their interests whether for or against change.80 While these make a strong case 
for the continuing relevance of this kernel of realism, the explanations of social and 
institutional change in any of the examples cited cannot properly be made without 
taking account of the catalytic influence of persons who were moved by a form of 
consciousness that is a step above the rational self-interest recognised in Realism. 
Power applied in self-interest is a valid historical postulate, but not the only one. 
History is as much about Mandelas as it is about Malans.81 
Therefore in assessing the prospects for renegotiating women's relationships at the 
respective levels of political-economy, we must be open to the possibilities for new 
forms of consciousness among those who now hold power and privilege, while being 
realistic about the need for struggle in terms of power. 
The negotiations to be undertaken are interdependent. Men will not contribute 
more at home in large numbers unless popular culture and/or religious convictions 
encourage them to do so and/or unless women get to earn more in their own right.82 
To this end, theological engagement in religious contexts, and popular dialogue 
through the arts and mass media are critical to gender bargaining both at home and 
in markets and public institutions. Theoretical and factual engagement in the 
knowledge structure are vital in expanding the mental horizons of bankers and 
public agencies which make decisions about the feasibility of lending to women, or 
financing social programmes which empower women at home and in markets.83 The 
mobilisation of women voters draws debates and decisions on public expenditures 
and legislation in the direction of women's concerns. Even in countries without a 
meaningful vote, the legitimacy of regimes can be fostered or undermined by the 
attitudes to them of women who are organised. The protests of mothers of the 
disappeared in Argentina during the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 80s are 
eloquent testimony to this. Women can get and keep the attention of companies and 
states by what they organise not to buy in terms of consumer goods. The deal can 
be: treat us right in the workplace and we'll treat you right in the supermarket. In 
the contexts of civil and regional wars, women can open their own dialogues across 
lines of conflict and offer alternate approaches to disagreement and negotiation. If 
this can be presented to men and states on their own sides as routes to security and 
economic growth, it would at once empower the women of those regions and aid 
social and economic development. Where the propensity to address conflicts by use 
of force feeds on local values which see that as honourable and heroic, women can 
respond by valuing a different image of desirable masculinity. Guerrilla fighters 
80 A helpful interpretation is offered in the chapter on Max Weber in Lewis A. Coser, Masters of 
Sociological Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977). 81 This refers, of course, to two contrasting figures in South African history, with Mandela seeming to 
have gone against the grain of immediate self-interest for the sake of social justice. Realism and 
idealism are not dichotomous, but dialectical. For a sceptical view, see Roger D. Spegele, 'Is robust 
globalism a mistake?', Review of International Studies, 23:2, 1997. 82 Studies in both developed and developing areas have shown that women's negotiating authority within 
households increases with their independent earnings. See Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, 
American Couples: Money, Work, Sex (New York: William Morrow, 1983), esp. pp. 53, 77 and 164; 
also Bessie House-Midamba and Felix K. Ekechi (eds.), African Market Women and Economic Power: 
the Role of Women in African Economic Development (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). 83 
Micro-lending on the Grameen Bank model has proven useful in empowering poor women in 
different regions of the world. Both state and non-governmental sources of funds have been vital 
catalysts. See for example 'Women in Africa's Development: Overcoming Obstacles, Pushing for 
Progress', Africa Recovery, (United Nations Department of Public Information: Briefing Paper no. 
11, April 1998). 
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could then begin to run out of girlfriends and would have to make choices literally 
between love and war. 
Two notes of caution are needed. 
One is that the goods at stake comprise different mixes of intellectual, emotional 
and material elements in the seven systems of political economy. In the knowledge, 
meaning and law structures much of the currency of power is cognitive?words, 
images, ways of understanding?even though they have deep implications for 
material and emotional resource-allocation. Mobilisation and bargaining on these 
fronts carries grave challenges and even penalties, but is not prohibitively expensive 
in energy and money.84 By contrast, the currencies of power in the production, 
finance and security structures are more directly material, and male incumbency is 
deeply entrenched in patterns of ownership and control. Negotiating change in these 
material systems runs into suffer resistance and is costlier to mobilise and sustain. 
Translating gains in the knowledge, meaning and law structures into gains in the 
production, finance and security structures will largely depend on access to 
organised shares of state power, and even better organised control of consumer 
spending.85 In households the good at stake is as much affective as material. Even in 
countries where men and the state have moved on to enlightened self-interest in the 
empowerment of women, actual change in domestic bargains lags behind the 
provisions of legislation and the pronouncements of popular discourse.86 Even in 
Sweden, with its post-war history of gender equalising ideology and state policies for 
the marketplace and household, men's contribution to unpaid labour in the private 
sphere has not nearly matched that of women.87 This was so while Swedish women 
were approaching the highest percentage of earned income in relation to men (45%) 
in any country, and the highest rates of representation in parliament (40%), 
administration and management (39%), and professional and technical occupations 
(64%).88 This suggests that gender bargaining in the nurture/reproduction structure 
will in most instances follow rather than lead those in states, markets and 
congregations. 
The second note demands a section of its own. 
6. Rival women 
There should be no illusions that gender solidarity among women will be any more 
impregnable than that among workers generally in their struggles with companies, 
developing states in their bargaining with transnational corporations, colonised 
peoples in their resistance to imperialism, or even abolitionists in their fight against 
slavery. At moments of heightened engagement in each wave of the human surge for 
justice, there has been the temptation for the emergent side to see in its project the 
84 The price to be paid may include ostracism or excommunication in the religious structure or 
promotion, tenure and research grants denied in the knowledge structure. 85 I have argued that despite the loss of state power in relation to capital, access to state power is critical 
to bargaining power for workers in 'Rival Worker' (see fn. 4). 86 See Nelson 'Sweden: Equality and Difference' (see fn. 52). 87 Eduards 'Toward a Third Way' (fn. 52). 88 See Human Development Report, UNDP, 1997, Table 3, p. 152. 
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embodiment of virtue. Little acknowledgement is given to the pragmatic urgency 
and even cynicism that lurk among many on one's own side as reasons for 
supporting a project for change. But disappointment follows when allies accept deals 
with those who resist change, exposing narrower interests at the expense of the 
transformation of larger systems of relationships. Worse, many become what they 
once opposed when they come into their kingdom. Issues of gender justice are at a 
moment of heightened engagement and much of the rhetoric is all too familiar.89 
Not least among barriers to solidarity among women are divisions among them 
by mode of production, class, market competition and ethnicity. Women of the same 
class in the global mode of production compete for jobs when transnationals shift 
from high-wage to low-wage locations. Women in national capitalist production (or 
who aspire to it), and in state bureaucracies, compete with women who produce and 
sell in informal activity and/or in subsistence farming for influence on state policy 
and for access to new forms of credit.90 It is not unusual for women with careers in 
the formal economy in urban areas of the developing world and the suburbs of the 
developed world, to circumvent the nurture versus career problem by hiring 
poor(er?) women 'from the country' or from marginalised ethnic groups.91 Ulti 
mately, the pool of women and men seeking jobs, loans and market share is usually 
larger than the available opportunities at any level of the world economy. The 
resulting competition makes solidarity tenuous at the best of times. Additional 
factors such as the social distance of status/lifestyle, ethnic insularity, and geo 
graphic/communications inaccessibility only make solidarity more difficult. Add to 
these, strong differences among politically attentive women on questions such as 
reproductive rights and public benefits for poor women, and we have the picture of a 
divided agenda. This affects gender bargaining with states on the design of public 
legislation, and that within religious and popular contexts on the ethics of specific 
elements of empowerment for women. 
Essentialist feminism suggests that women are naturally closer to values of 
interdependence and mutual welfare than men because these flow out of the impera 
tives of nurture. This would lead us to expect that women would demonstrate more 
solidarity than men in the public sphere. This analysis suggests that even if this were 
true in particular cultures, women's solidarity does not cross class and ethnic lines 
very well.92 
By and large, women with greater education, social networks and access to 
communication and political influence, increase their gains in the marketplace and at 
89 One is reminded of the Utopian speeches coming from revolutionary movements and governments in 
the Non-Aligned Movement and UN General Assembly in the 1970s, or from radical social 
movements of the 1960s. 
90 See Mary J. Osirim, 'Vehicles for Change and Empowerment: Urban Women's Organizations in 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe', paper presented to the NGO Forum on Women '95, Huairou, The People's 
Republic of China, August 30 to September 8, 1995. 91 It seems ironic that what women need to do in order to advance in the market place, with all the 
benefits to society that that implies, may require more time out of households and thus, more time by 
other women in those same households. The commoditisation of nurture displaces still other women 
of a different class from nurture in their own families, and marginal compensation does not always 
match marginal effort or social cost. 92 This points to the idea of different feminisms in a different way, that is, varieties bound by class and 
ethnicity. In any case, contrary to Essentialist expectations, gender does not predict pacifism and 
solidarity for women. See Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner, 'Gender, Feminism and Attitude Toward 
International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East', World 
Politics, 49 (January 1997), pp. 250-81. 
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home faster than do women without these advantages. These gains are not easily 
shared with others across class lines. Legal gains of a non-distributional nature 
(rights and freedoms, as against benefits) that are spearheaded by elite women can, 
by contrast, apply to poor women in given countries. The more feasible bargaining 
solidarity for gains in the legal system is not easily transferred to struggles where 
redistribution of tangible benefits is involved. But to the extent that the majority of 
the world's women are engaged in informal and subsistence economic activity, this 
leaves untouched most of the people and most of the challenges of contemporary 
world political economy. 
In short, gender bargaining will show results in the households, markets and 
public institutions of the global and national-capitalist modes of production far 
more quickly than they will in those of the informal and subsistence modes. It 
suggests the primacy of market and class dynamics over gender in shaping the fate 
of the majority of the world's women. 
7. Implications 
The foregoing analysis suggests that gender does not confer special insights on 
justice or human solidarity. Women, like men, express a range of forms of 
consciousness and bargain in pursuit of them. In some cultures, patterns of 
socialisation might produce attitudes of cooperative self interest more among 
women than among men. But the analysis also suggests that the reality of women's 
experiences of marginalisation in the world economy and victimhood in war, which 
makes them a class in themselves, does not by itself lead to consciousness of the 
need to oppose the causes of that marginalisation and violence. Common fates do 
not necessarily lead to common bonds.93 While the core issues of world political 
economy are gendered, they are also more immediately configured in terms of class 
within-mode of production and ethnicity. 
Women's gains in recent years in access to labour markets, with associated legal 
rights and care/career support, have been facilitated by their consistency with the 
needs of firms that have to compete in global markets, and with the attendant 
policies of the most powerful states and IGOs. Women who are upwardly mobile in 
national or global capitalism are not likely to go much beyond Liberal feminism. 
Liberal feminism has become a feature in the human face of capitalist ideology. But 
even in its Radical or Essentialist expressions, feminism is a reforming force in world 
society, and not a revolutionary one. Its potential for solidarity, whether derived 
from values of nurture and interdependence, or not, is not greater than the market 
competitive and class divisions fostered by global or national capitalism, or the 
chasms of ethnicity and emotional distance. Radical movements, feminist or not, 
cannot transform global capitalism, but might redirect it.94 Women's solidarity may 
not smother ethnic conflicts, but could make them less violent. 
The primary division in contemporary world political economy is between the 
classes?women and men together?who want to go with the flow of globalisation 
93 An allusion to Mitter's book entitled Common Fates, Common Bond. 
94 This was an argument in Allen 'Rival Workers'. 
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and those who do not, or cannot. To that extent, different feminisms point women in 
different historical directions, sometimes empowering them to join men in projects 
of coercion and control.95 Women's empowerment changes the public/private sphere 
bargains within modes, but not necessarily between them. 
Liberal and Essential feminisms are quite adequate for limited reform. Critical 
approaches go beyond this to try to change the bargains between classes in the 
global mode and others outside it where most women live, from a win-lose to a win 
win basis, and try to reduce violence as a technique of conflict.96 
Empowering women among the poor majority of the world's population cannot 
be separated from wider strategies of sustainable development, human rights and 
conflict-resolution. 
8. Conclusions 
Both new discourses and feminist contributions are changing IPE to become a more 
widely-focused and better integrated field within IR. The core concerns have shifted 
and the boundaries of analysis have been expanded. Questions of war and peace, 
ecology and sustainability may be problematised in their related contexts of market, 
class, ethnicity and gender. 
Bargaining can be a valuable organising concept around which to integrate the 
analysis of complex dynamics of market, class and gender. By expanding the uni 
verse of functions that are recognised in IPE to include nurture/reproduction, and 
the construction of meaning, values and identity, the nature and implications of 
women's contribution to the world economy can become apparent as a matter of 
course. 
Social change for greater justice is the product of both organised power and 
moral enlightenment. On matters of gender, the prospects for change by way of 
organised power are limited, but change can be hastened by new ways of thinking in 
the several systems of the world economy. The complementarity of organised power 
and moral debate is likely to produce results faster for women in formal economic 
activity across the world. New gender bargains in global and national capitalism 
may reform the terms of women's participation in those markets and their governing 
institutions. However, they may not necessarily also overcome the basic problems of 
poverty and ethnic conflict that affect the fortunes of the majority of the world's 
women. 
95 This seems to be what the Liberal feminist push for women in the US military is about. 96 Such a project would be based on assumptions of: difference in values, wants, knowledges and 
economic goals among peoples within and outside of global capitalism; freedom of choice of modes 
of production and culture to live in; complementary technologies, infrastructures and resource 
environments; and compatibility of authoritative decision-making procedures. See Nelson W Keith, 
Reframing International Development: Globalism, Postmodernity and Difference (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1997). 
